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INTRODUCTION
The issues surrounding jurisdiction to review the
conduct of judicial officers occurring prior to appointment
to the bench constitute issues of first impression before this
Court,

Ultimate resolution of these issues necessitates not

only a constitutional interpretation by this Court, but also
directly impacts regulation of the judiciary, public policy
and confidence in Utah's system of judicial administration.
Due to the demanding and potentially far-reaching
nature of the issues facing the Court, presentation and
consideration of arguments in response to the generalized and
generic

assertions

warranted.

contained

in

Appellee's

Brief

are

Such additional arguments are necessitated to

refocus the Court's attention on issues obscured by Appellee's
broad-brush treatment of important and technical issues.
ARGUMENT
A.

The Narrow Interpretation And Limitation Of The Mandates
Of Article VIII, Section 13 Encouraged By Appellee Is
Neither Warranted Nor Supportable.
Appellee

argues

the

preeminence

of

State

Bar

jurisdiction to review pre-appointment conduct of judges or
justices by encouraging this Court to narrowly interpret the
constitutional mandate of Article VIII, Section 13, which
establishes the Judicial Conduct Commission.

Specifically,

Appellee argues that such provision vests the Judicial Conduct
Commission only with "narrow authority" to investigate and

discipline judges and justices for "official misconduct."
(Appellee's Brief, Page 2).

However, even the most casual

reading of the constitutional

language reveals that such

unsupported assertions are nothing more than Appellee's own
artificial

interpretive

restrictions

on

the

express

constitutional mandate.
In pertinent part, Article VIII, Section 13 actually
states:
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established which
shall investigate and conduct confidential hearings
regarding complaints against any justice or judge.
(Emphasis added; see Appendix A for full text of Article VIII,
Section 13.)

Appellee's assertion that the provision on its

face is "narrow" or limited solely to "official misconduct"
requires the overlooking

of its actual language and the

interlineation of Appellee's own desired reading.
thereby

presumes

to

supplant

the

language

of

Appellee
the

Utah

Constitution with Appellee's own, ostensibly substituting its
own judgment regarding judicial administration for that of the
general public who selected the constitutional language by
referendum.

Such artificial jurisdictional restrictions are

nothing more than fictitious amendments to the unequivocal
language that the Judicial Conduct Commission has jurisdiction
over any "complaints against any justice or judge."
In response to such arguments, Appellant continues
to rely upon and direct the Court's attention to the broad and

2

unequivocal language of Article VIII, Section 13 in support
of its position that the Judicial Conduct Commission has been
constitutionally

granted preeminent jurisdiction over any

complaint against any justice or judge.

No limitation is

contained within the Constitutional grant of authority, and
none

can

therefore

be

justified,

Appellee's

attempts

notwithstanding.
In a further

attempt to

restrict

jurisdiction,

Appellee also asserts that "the Bar's broad authority to
regulate the practice of law through the discipline of its
members pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4 takes precedence
unless

and

until

one

of

the

specific

grounds

for

the

Commission's jurisdiction found in Article VIII, Section 13
applies,"

(Appellee's Brief, Page 3.)

Although Appellee

cites no authority for such a statement, it is clear from the
broad language and subsequent broad jurisdictional grant of
Article VIII, Section 13, that no constitutional conflict or
issues of precedence exist regarding the Bar's authority to
regulate the practice of law. Judges and justices, by virtue
of their office, do not and cannot "practice law." The Bar's
authority and jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law,
pursuant to the authority granted to it by this Court, is
neither changed or threatened by their lack of authority to
discipline judges or justices.
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Moreover, Appellee's assertions fail to distinguish
the jurisdictional portion of Article VIII, Section 13 from
the requisite grounds necessary for discipline. The specific
grounds referred to by Appellee are grounds for discipline,
not

jurisdiction.

The

jurisdictional

language

of

the

provision is found in the first sentence, which mandates that
the Commission "investigate and conduct confidential hearings
regarding complaints against any justice or judge."
jurisdictional

language

is

notably

distinguishable

Such
and

separate from the specified grounds for discipline.
B.

Appellee's Claim To Jurisdiction By Application Of Its
Chronological Test Is Theoretically And Practically
Flawed.
Appellee asserts that any apparent conflict between

the

provisions

of

Article

VIII,

Section

13

and

rules

promulgated under the authority of Article VIII, Section 4 is
an illusionary product of Appellant's misunderstanding and
misinterpretation of the language and intent of Article VIII,
Section 13.

Appellee asserts that the root of Appellant's

error is the failure to interpret Article VIII, Section 13 as
granting jurisdiction to the Commission only to review "the
conduct of judges and justices in their official, judicial
capacity."

In so arguing, Appellee misstates Appellant's

position in order to set up a "straw man" with whom to do
battle.

Appellant argues not that Section 4 and Section 13

of Article VIII are in conflict, but that rules promulgated
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exception is proper due to the disability or disrepute which
may result to the judicial office.

Both the chronological

test and the simplistic felony exception ignore important
judicial

administration

policy

considerations

argued

in

Appellant's opening brief, and set up formulas which are
insensitive to the situational nuances of judicial discipline.
Appellee
exception"

is

overlooks

not

merely

the
an

fact

that

exception

its
to

a

"felony
strict

chronological grant of jurisdiction to the Commission, but
rather is based upon a totally separate analysis of the
conduct's effect, rather than its chronology.

Moreover,

Appellee selects only one of the five specified discipline
areas for conduct involving judges or justices as an exception
to the chronological test Appellee advocates. The other four
areas, Appellee would argue, ar subject to the restriction of
the time when the conduct occurred.

Appellee presumes again

to rewrite the constitutional mandate.
Paragraphs (2), (4) and (5) of Article VIII, Section
13

illustrate the problems which

arise through

creating

exceptions to a false chronological jurisdiction test by
resort to conduct analysis. In addition to conduct amounting
to a felony, such paragraphs respectively provide that a judge
or justice may be disciplined for "disability that seriously
interferes with the performance of judicial duties," and
"conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which

6

i.
felonies,

man>

..J;.:

- - .,.i.

other

set**,

disrepute."
M

Tn addition to many

• nndu -t

^-" •:- -^ ^ *

» • -L to

assurotion •" *
attei

, .. nnon

assum^, JJI- * i

udicia;

ri ice

3

*:- *. i, conaact may include among ether things acts

of dishonest V* r^r-r-*" «-nv**-w *-n^,*

«~J proff' ~*

. .
code.

G O constitute

*->*^ orfooiance "f

conduct which is deb i 1 i t at i ru: *

disrepute.

i

• iv

.

.1 i ne<.

Moreover, each such situa* ion,

nc ,1 ~

" .-

riir^ na I

th<=> '^mpli"^4*

filed against Appellan* s
I::l i) =! r e q u i r e m e n t s s e t f..aui .

, • agrapis

'•
f

T h e t h e o ret i ca 1 a nd p r a c t i c a 1
,lr%v,

1 av?c?

?T '

:•;:

tesr .

. * 4 * : -r wi c,w n o jurisdictional
Appeiiee

4

would

affirmatively

advocate

•\

)

i

••

,

;LI .

~ ^ P ] ^ -• ->! s
.,

he

'ndar s u c h p o s t u r e ,

tnat

J

ecause o,
uatut>- (Ctah C o d e A n n . *> ;b-1)

i

r* 1 .

*
, •, ^ ; -

:

.. : .

• atomatical i * b-

-v^r<=> disrepute *- - ^idicial offi*~"> **
umpetencp -

* .,u leu^oiuiig presents seriL-us

doubts r\"t on 1A as to its results
of Appei ieo ' ^

*uv "^p 1 ~~ ' c : 1 * •

luc jnronoiocijui t ^ i
Appellee

.*;

.-

£

•,* a *-r. _t^ t_ the soundness
;

*^

f.

;r jurisdiction advocated

• escapabl^

debmia" •

^n!^"dus' -n

f h

' it

:.Asi . w

7

in judicial office is ipso facto damaging or debilitative to
the judicial office itself, while same conduct occurring a day
prior to taking office is not.

Such an argument is specious

on its face, and such a conclusion is without reasonable
basis.
Finally, Appellee asserts that since the Judicial
Conduct Commission determined it did not have jurisdiction in
this matter,

lf

[t]his Court may presume that Appellant's

misconduct is not conduct that would impair his judicial
function, such as a conviction of a felony or misconduct that
would bring his judicial office into disrepute."

This Court

need "presume" nothing of the kind. Article VIII, Section 13
expressly grants to the Supreme Court powers of plenary review
of all proceedings before Judicial Conduct Commission for
correctness "as to both law and fact."
Article VIII, Section 13.

Utah Constitution,

Appellee's inference that the

Supreme Court is either obligated or should accept without
review the Judicial Conduct Commission determination of lack
of jurisdiction is clearly misplaced and without merit. This
Court is charged with the duty of determining the scope and
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, and neither can nor
should abdicate this role to the Judicial Conduct Commission
or to the Bar.
C.

Attorney Influence and Control of Judicial Discipline
Should be Minimized to Avoid Inherent Conflict.

8

Appellant asserts that allowing the Bar to review
judicial conduct creates inherent conflict by placing judges
in the untenable position of facing allegations of unfair
treatment or favoritism by the judge towards attorneys on or
affiliated with the review panel.

Appellee summarily and

superficially dismisses Appellant's argument as an unavoidable
conflict since attorneys are presently appointed to both the
Bar's disciplinary panels and the Judicial Conduct Commission.
However, the danger posed by such conflicts cannot be so
superficially rationalized and minimized.
Such conflicts pose serious and destructive threats
to the administration of the justice system and public's
confidence therein. This Court has a charge to safeguard the
reputation and administration of public confidence in the
judicial system.

Every effort should be made by this Court

to minimize the occurrence or possibility of such inherent
conflict,

regardless

of whether

such

efforts

result

in

complete elimination or merely minimize the risk of conflict.
While Appellee correctly asserts that attorneys are
present on both panels, such a blanket assertion fails to
consider the underlying issue of panel control.

It is hardly

a point of dispute that the Bar screening panel is not only
comprised principally of attorneys but is a branch of and
controlled by the Utah State Bar.

Consequently, if a Bar

panel is granted jurisdiction, there is greater actual risk

9

or, at the very least, a increased potential risk of conflict
and judge-attorney contact, interaction and conflict.
On the other hand, the Judicial Conduct Commission
is

a

constitutionally

and

statutorily

separate

entity,

comprised of two members of the Utah House of Representatives,
two members of the Utah Senate, two governor-appointed public
members, as well as three Bar commissioners and one judge.
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27, U.C.A.)
percent

of

the

Commission

is

The fact that sixty
reserved

to

public

representatives or governor appointed non-members of the Bar
adds

immediate

advantage

and

creditability

over a panel

exclusively comprised of attorneys and controlled by the Bar.
Moreover,

the

Judicial

Conduct

Commission

exists

as

an

independent commission, while the Bar screening panel exists
as an administrative branch of the State Bar itself.
It is both reasonable and realistic to believe that
public confidence will be maximized and inherent conflict
minimized by a commission independent of the governing arm of
the

state

attorneys

association

and

upon

which

appointed representatives constitute a majority.

10

public

D.

Appelleefs Constitutional Distinctions Are Unfounded.
Appellee

has

attempted

to

distinguish

Utah

constitutional provisions from those of other states who vest
their Judicial Conduct Commissions with exclusive jurisdiction
over judiciary members.

For instance, Appellant originally

cited In re Speiser, 445 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1984) for its holding
that

the

Florida

Judicial

Qualifications

Commission

has

jurisdiction to discipline a judge for acts occurring prior
to his assumption of judicial office. Appellee has attempted
to distinguish Speiser by noting that the Florida constitution
"grants jurisdiction to the Judicial Qualifications Commission
for conduct occurring during the term of office or otherwise.If
In re Speiser, 445 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis in
Appellee's Brief, Page 9). The Utah Constitution, Appellee
argues, contains no such general provision for review of
extra-judicial conduct by the commission.
However,

Appelleefs

argument

identifies

a

distinction without a difference. While th£ Utah constitution
may not expressly provide for review of extra-judicial conduct
by the commission, neither does it prohibit such review.
Rather it states simply that the commission shall investigate
any "complaints against any justice or judge." Such language
is without limitation and by its broad terms encompasses at
least as broad a grant of authority as that found in the
Florida Constitution. Appellee's argument to the contrary is
superficial.
11

CONCLUSION
Appellant

acknowledges

that

courts

are

not

in

agreement on the issues of jurisdiction over incumbent judges
for conduct occurring prior to the assumption of judicial
office.

However, Appellant

asserts that

investiture of

exclusive jurisdiction with the Judicial Conduct Commission
best

assures

maintenance

of

judiciary

reputation

and

confidence, while maximizing avoidance of inherent conflicts.
Such jurisdictional issues can and should be resolved by
reference to the express provisions of Article VIII, Section
13 of the Utah Constitution which unequivocally grants to the
Judicial

Conduct Commission the authority

to

investigate

"complaints against justices or judges," without reference to
chronological limitation.
Moreover, public confidence and esteem of judicial
office

is more reasonably preserved

and protected by an

independent constitutionally mandated panel comprised of sixty
percent

public

officials

and

governor-appointed

persons,

rather than a panel exclusively comprised of and controlled
by Utah attorneys.
Even in the event exclusive jurisdiction is not
found to exist on the fact of Article VIII, Section 13,
Appellant asserts that the proper analysis of jurisdiction
rests upon analysis of the conduct and its relationship upon
the office, rather than a meaningless chronological line
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drawing.

Under such proper analysis, the underlying issues

raised by the Complaint herein support Judicial

Conduct

Commission jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully
requests that this Court determine that jurisdiction in this
matter rests with the Judicial Conduct Commission.
DATED this 11th day of June, 1990.
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS

BY. ^ ^ ^ > ^
Michael L. Dowdl^y Esq.
Stephen K. Christensen, Esq.
Robert L. Payne, Esq.
Attorneys for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 11th day of June, 1990,
I did cause to be hand delivered a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to the following:
Toni Marie Sutliff, Esq.
Ralph Adams, Esq.
Office of Bar Counsel
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3834
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

officer for the courts and shall implement the rules
adopted by the Judicial Council.
1985

Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.]
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established
which shall investigate and conduct confidential
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary
retirement of any justice or judge for the following:
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in
office;
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial
duties;
(4) disability that seriously interfere^ with the performance of judicial duties; or
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the supreme court shall review the commission's
proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may
also permit the introduction of additional evidence.
After its review, the supreme court shall, as it finds
just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission's order. The Legislature by statute shall provide for the composition
and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission.
1985

Sec. 14. [Compensation of justices and judges.]
The Legislature shall provide for the compensation
of all justices and judges. The salaries of justices and
judges shall not be diminished during their terms of
Office.

1985

Sec. 15. [Mandatory retirement]
The Legislature may provide standards for the
mandatory retirement of justices and judges from office.
1985

Sec. 16. [Public prosecutors.]
The Legislature shall provide for a system of public
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for
the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the
name of the State of Utah and shall perform such
other duties as may be provided by statute. Public

The Senate shall consist of a me
exceed twenty-nine in number, an<
representatives shall never be less
greater than three times the numt
Sec. 3. [Renumbered as Section
cle.]
Sec. 4.

[Repealed.]
ARTICLE X
EDUCATION

Section
1. [Free nonsectarian schools.]
2. [Defining what shall constitute t
system.]
3. [State Board of Education.]
4. [Control of higher education systi
Rights; and immunity
5. [State School Fund and Uniform
Establishment and ut
6. [Repealed.]
7. [Proceeds of land grants consti*
funds.]
8. INo religious or partisan tests i
9. [Public aid to church schools fo
10. [Repealed.]
11. [Repealed.]
12. [Renumbered.]
13. I Renumbered.]
Section 1. [Free nonsectarian sc
The Legislature shall provide for th
and maintenance of the state's educa
eluding: (a) a public education system
open to all children of the state; ai
education system. Both systems sha
sectarian control.
Sec. 2. [Defining what shall cons
lie school system.]
The public education system shall
lie elementary and secondary schools
schools and programs as the Legisla
nate. The higher education system s
nnhlir universities and colleges and ^

